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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal filed by Aspen Park, Inc. requesting this Court reverse the district
court's ruling (Honorable Joel E. Tingey) on summary judgment in favor of Bonneville County.
The district court correctly held that the plain language of I.C. § 63-602GG precluded Appellant
from qualifying for a low-income housing property tax exemption where not all of Appellant's
units were dedicated to that purpose.

Instead, Appellant leases some of its units to tenants who

are not considered low-income, as prescribed by statute.

B.

Course of Proceedings

On March 10, 2016, Appellant requested a property tax exemption from Bonneville
County under LC.§ 602GG.

Sitting as a Board of Equalization, the Bonneville County

Commissioners denied this request on May 9, 2016.

R. pp. 15-17.

Appellant then appealed to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals on June 28, 2016.

R. p. 13.

After hearing, the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals reversed the Board of County Commissioners,
R. pp. 429-437.

asserting that the tax exemption was proper.
filed for reconsideration on April 5, 2017.

R. pp. 440-443.

However, Bonneville County
After considering briefing from

both parties, the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals reversed itself, holding that because not all of the
units were dedicated to low income housing, the property tax exemption was inappropriate.
pp. 457-464.

R.

Appellant moved for reconsideration of this decision on May 8, 2017, claiming

the statute was ambiguous.

R. pp. 466-469.

and denied reconsideration.

R. pp. 493-494.

But the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals disagreed

On June 20, 2017, Petitioner filed for Judicial Review before the Seventh Judicial District
Court.

R. pp. 497-499.
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On September 8, 2017, Bonneville County moved for summary

judgment, alleging no issue of material fact existed, and that the issues before the district court
pertained only to application of law to the facts.

R. p. 901.

After much briefing and argument

on summary judgment, the Honorable Joel E. Tingey agreed with Bonneville County that
Appellant's use of its property was not consistent with the non-profit low-income property tax
exemption statute because Appellant was not using all of its property for low-income housing.
R. pp. 961-967.
Judgment was entered on October 23, 2017.

R. p. 969.

On December 1, 2017, Appellant timely appealed to this Court. R. p. 971-974.

C.

Statement of Facts

The facts are not in dispute.
tax purposes.

R. p. 48.

Appellant is a 50l(c)(3) non-profit organization for income

Appellant owns 72 units.

Id.

Appellant also is also subject to a

Section 42 regulatory agreement that on page 5 requires 76% of Appellant's units (not less than
54 units) remain designated as low-income units.

See Regulatory Agreement R. pp. 70-92,

Agreement of Limited Partnership R. pp. 94-157, Redemption Agreement R. pp. 172-186. This
agreement remains in place until 2023 (15 year compliance period plus another 15 years after the
compliance period).
42 housing.

R. p. 77.

R. p. 423.

Appellant even recently acknowledges its property is Section

Despite its designation as Section 42 housing, Appellant filed a

request for a complete property tax exemption as a non-profit organization under I.C. § 63602GG rather than requesting property tax relief as Section 42 housing under I.C. §63-205A.
Of Appellants 72 units, Appellants represented that as of June 15, 2016, these units were
occupied as follows:
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ASPEN PARK

R. p. 33-35. 1

Median Income

% of Units(# of Units)

~60%

::::: 16.66% (12 Units)

::; 60% - > 50%

::::: 8.33% (6 Units)

::; 50% - > 30%

::::: 34.72% (25 Units)

::; 30%

::::: 27.77% (20 Units)

Vacant

::::: 12.50% (9 Units)

TOTAL UNITS

I 00% (72 Total Units)

Appellant acknowledges that 12 units have been rented to individuals whose

income exceeds the 60% county median income threshold.

See Appellant 's Brief, p. 3.

Because these 12 units exceed the low income class ifications contained in LC. § 63 60200, Appe llant has been denied a tax exemption.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Is Appellant entitled to the property tax exemption where Appellant fails to meet the
statutory burden of having " all" of its units dedicated to low income housing?
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is proper ' if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on fi le,
together with the affi davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

1 Please note that prior versions of Respondent's calculations presented to the lower court re ferred to the apartment
counts that are contained on R. p. 192- 195, which on ly account for between 62 and 63 uni ts-likely due to
vacancies. Apparently, the chart on R. p. 33-35 includes all 72 units. Though the percentages change slightly due
to the charts that are used, the principles outlined in this brief remain the same, as a number of the units are rented to
individuals whose income exceed the 60% of the county median income.
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that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" I.R.C.P. 56(c); Arreguin v.

Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,460, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994).
Summary judgment is mandated when a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.R.C.P. 56(a); Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestor Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432,437 (Ct. App. 1988),
meaning that if there is no cognizable defense, then there are no genuine issues of material fact
and as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Further,
Resolution of the possible conflict between the inferences is within
the responsibilities of the fact finder. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho
898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997). This Court exercises free
review over the entire record that was before the district judge to
determine whether either side was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law and reviews the inferences drawn by the district judge to
determine whether the record reasonably supports those inferences.

P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Tr., 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874
(2007).

ARGUMENT
I.

SEPARATION OF POWERS PRECLUDES THIS COURT FROM DEVISING AN
INTERPRETATION NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
STATUTE.
This case is essentially one of statutory interpretation and the separation of powers.

Appellants request this Court enforce an interpretation of statute, rather than follow the plain

language of the statute enacted by the legislature.
legislate.

In short, Appellants request that this Court

The Constitution of the State of Idaho mandates:
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The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Idaho Const. Art. II, § 1.

This constitutional article is consistent with the United States

Supreme Court decision of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 148 and 176. 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Eighty-seven (87) years before Idaho became a state, the United States Supreme Court held the
Constitution of the United States confers original jurisdiction to one of three branches of
government, which are not to be encroached upon by other branches.

"To what purpose are

powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may,
at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?

[ ... ]

The constitution is either a

superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary
legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it."
at 176-77.

Id.

Perhaps not so eloquently restated, our constitution is either the supreme law of the

land or it isn't.

If the supreme law of the land establishes boundaries, each branch of

government is to act within those tried and true boundaries, not beyond them.
The Constitution of the State of Idaho establishes the same separation of powers
boundaries as the United States.
interpret and enforce the laws.

It empowers the legislature to enact laws and the courts to
Idaho Const. Art. III and V.

It is therefore imperative courts

resist the temptation of delving into the power of legislating.
This Court has appropriately remained sensitive to this separation of powers and
enforcing the intent of the legislature by following the plain language of the statutes:
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we
exercise free review. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719
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(2003). It must begin with the literal words of the statute, those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and
the statute must be construed as a whole. Id If the statute is not
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the
law as written. Id. [. . . ] If the statute as written is socially or
otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not
judicial. Id.

State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004) abrogated on other grounds
by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,896,265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011).
Citing several Idaho Supreme Court decisions, the Idaho Court of Appeals also reasoned:
The interpretation of a statute begins with its literal words. Those
words must be given their plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but
simply follows the law as written. A statute is ambiguous where
the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction.
Ambiguity is not established merely because different
interpretations are presented by the parties. If that were the test
then all statutes whose meanings are contested in litigation could be
"[A] statute is not ambiguous merely
considered ambiguous.
because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation
of it." 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho at 354, 298 P.3d at
248.

Bonner Cty. v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291,295, 323 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Ct. App. 2014)
(Citations omitted, bold emphasis added); see also Verska, 151 Idaho at 892,265 P.3d at 505.
In 2011, this Court also clarified this principal while still affirming the constitutional principal of
separation of powers:
[W]e have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the
ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results
when construed as written, and we do not have the authority to do
so. "The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be
questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts
might not agree with the public policy so announced." State v.
Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 525, 265 P.2d 328, 334
(1953). Indeed, the contention that we could revise an unambiguous
statute because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd
results is itself illogical. "A statute is ambiguous where the language
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is capable of more than one reasonable construction." Porter v.
Board of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14,
105 P.3d 671,674 (2004). An unambiguous statute would have only
one reasonable interpretation.
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896,265 P.3d at 509.

In this case, Appellant requests this Court cross the boundary between the judicial and
legislative branches of government by using astute minds to devise an interpretation of a very
plain statute.
II.

Instead, this Court should follow the plain language of the statute.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES 100% OF THE
HOUSING UNITS BE RENTED BY LOW INCOME OCCUPANTS.

Because Appellant has not dedicated all of its units to low income housing, it is not
entitled to the low-income housing property tax exemption under LC.§ 63-60200.
Before getting stuck in a mire of federal regulations regarding safe harbors that are not
controlling over state law, it is imperative to remember this case is about the exemption of
property taxes imposed by Idaho counties, NOT the exemption of income taxes imposed by the

federal government2 •

Understanding this distinction debunks the temptation to consider federal

regulations that muddy and then interpret an otherwise plain state statute.
J.C. § 63-60300 allows county commissioners to grant a local property tax exemption
for properties belonging to non-profit companies that are entirely dedicated to low income
housing.

The statute plainly defines how this dedication takes place:

2

Appellant improperly addresses whether its organization falls under safe harbors of§ 50l(c)(3). A 50l(c)(3)
designation is merely a threshold requirement to even apply for this property tax exemption. See LC. § 63602GG(2)(b). Instead, the property tax exemption statute focuses on the actual practices and performance of the
501(c)(3) organization. Bonneville County does not contest Appellant's 50l(c)(3) designation. Instead,
Appellant simply fails to meet the performance requirements of the property tax exemption statute.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7

(3) In order to qualify for the exemption provided in this section,
the low-income housing property shall meet the following
qualifications:

[... ]
(c) Except for a manager's unit, ALL of the housing units in
the low-income housing property are dedicated to low-income
housing IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: Fifty-five percent
(55%) of the units shall be rented to those earning sixty percent
( 60%) or less of the median income for the county in which the
housing is located; twenty percent (20%) of the units shall be
rented to those earning fifty percent (50%) or less of the median
income of the county in which the housing is located; AND
twenty-five percent (25%) of the units shall be rented to those
earning thirty percent (30%) or less of the median income for the
county in which the housing is located.

I.C. § 603GG(c)(3).
A.

Emphasis added.

Denial of the Property Tax Exemption Was Appropriate Where the Statute
is Coniunctive, Not Disiunctive.

Three key words in this statute require that property tax applicants must be completely
committed to low income housing with all of their units to qualify for the property tax
exemption: "ALL", "AND", and "SHALL".

Why would the statute say "ALL of the housing

units" if the legislature really meant "some" or "most" of the housing units?

Why would the

statute use the conjunctive word "AND" when connecting the income classifications if the
legislature really meant to use the disjunctive term "or"?
if the legislature really meant "should" or "may"?

Why would the statute say "SHALL",

The legislature did not err in its language.

It can be no coincidence with words like "all", "and", and "shall" that the sum total of the

percentages of both the units and the income classifications in the statute add up to exactly 100%
in order to qualify for the exemption.
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Clearly the legislature meant what it said.

Appellant argues that it qualifies for thi s exempti on when Appellant rents 12 of its 72
units (about 17%) to indi viduals who exceed the 60% of the county median income.

The

demographi cs of Appellant' s units are as foll ows:

ASPEN PARK
Median Income

% of Units(# of Units)

~60%

::::: 16.66% (12 Units)

~

60% - > 50%

~

50% - > 30%
~30%
Vacant

TOTAL UNITS

~

8.33% (6 Units)

~

34.72% (25 Units)

~

27.77% (20 Units)

~

12.50% (9 Units)

100% (72 Total Units)

In th is manner, not all of the units are used for low income housing.
units are not used fo r low-income housing.

In fact, about 17% o f the

T here fore, the property tax exemption cannot

apply.
Appe llant has argued an appli cation of this statute to "a ll of the housing units" is
unreasonable, as doing so would require 100% occupancy of the units.
legislature meant what it said.

We must presume the

Whether and how units will qualify for this property tax

exemption is an operational business consideration that a landlord has to make before he/she/it
can rely on the exem ption.

The language of the statute does not permit or require the County to

consider market cond iti ons in deciding whether or not to grant the exemption.
Regard less, perhaps an argument could be made that the focus of the statute is on the
allocation of units to certain income classes and not necessarily on occupancy.

RESPOND ENT" S BRIEF - 9

Under this

argument, even vacant units would be dedicated to be rented by low-income occupants so long as
none of the units rented exceed the 60%, 50% and 30% income thresholds prescribed by statute.
For example, consider a 100 unit apartment complex.

As long as the landlord does not allow

more than 55 of the apartments to be rented to those making above 60% of the county median
income, does not allow more than 75 apartments to be rented to those making above 50% of the
county median income, and ensures the remaining 25 apartments are either occupied by or
remain open only for those that do not make above 30% of the county median income, that lowincome housing unit may qualify for the exemption.

In such a manner, 100% of the units are

rented to or available for those in the qualifying income classes.

By focusing on the allocation

of the units as directed by the statute, landlords might avoid the precarious situation of the ebbs
and flows of tenants vacating and leaving the landlord in non-compliance.

True, landlords are

tasked with filling voids with low-income tenants from certain income classes-but this only
furthers the mission/policy of ensuring low income housing remains available for those in need
as prescribed by the legislature.
Even if this vacancy argument were a valid approach, in no event does Appellant's set of
facts comply with that argument or with the plain language of the statute, where 17% of the units
are rented to those who exceed the 60% county median income threshold.

If a landlord accepts

a tenant that is not considered low income, that landlord voluntarily jeopardizes his/her/its
potential property tax exemption.

Making this decision may not necessarily disqualify a

landlord from receiving the income tax exemption, but it clearly violates the plain language of
I.C. § 63-602GG pertaining to the property tax exemption.

Importantly, not "all" of the units

are dedicated to low income housing when 30, 17, or even 5 percent of the units are not.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- IO

In this case, not only do 17% of the tenants exceed the 60% income threshold, one of the
tenants actually exceeds 100% of the county median income.
clearly not permitted by the plain language of the statute.

R. p. 33.

These practices are

By leasing to those tenants, Appellant

has made a conscious decision to not dedicate "all" of its units to low-income housing as defined
in LC. 63- §602GG, and therefore jeopardized its own property tax exemption.

Appellant still

may qualify for income tax exemptions under federal law, but not the property tax exemption.

B.

The Plain Language ofl.C. § 63-602GG Requires 100% Compliance, Not
Righteous Aspirations.

It is truly admirable that Appellant aspires to the ideal of making its units available to
those renters who may qualify as low-income tenants.

But the low-income housing property

tax exemption is not an entitlement for those with good intentions.

Instead, if Appellant does

not want to pay property taxes, the legislature has clearly outlined how to dedicate the property
to obtain the property tax exemption by using the key phrase "in the following manner:."·
§. 63-60200(3)(c). (Emphasis added).

I.C.

The legislature could not have been clearer in saying

"non-profit organizations, this is how you earn the property tax exemption:" and then outlines
three income classes that "all of the housing units" must meet.

Id

(Emphasis added).

If the non-profit organization fails to comply, there is no penalty; instead the organization
simply has to pay property taxes like everyone else.

Nonprofit organizations must remain

vigilant in selecting only from the low-income classes identified in the statute if it seeks to obtain
the property tax exemption.
Appellant argues that so long as each income classification is met individually, then
Appellant is entitled to the tax exemption.

Using this disjunctive reading, only 55% of the units

would be required to be used for low-income housing as each subsequent income category can
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be contained within the prior category (a 30% or less and 50% or less of the median county
income is also contained in within the 60% or less of the median county income).

Appellant's

reading would therefore mean that 45% of the units, nearly half, do not need to be used for lowincome tenants.

This is in direct contradiction to the statutes' use of the word "all".

Other charitable and non-profit organizations do not receive similar treatment when they
are not using 100% of their property toward their cause.

As further evidence the legislature

meant what it said in stating "all" of the units must comply, consider LC. § 63-602C.

That

statute allows non-profit companies and charitable organizations to apply for a property tax
exemption, but only to the extent the non-profit company is using its property consistent with its
purposes and not for business purposes that derive a revenue.

Id.

For example, a church that

leases out 10% of its space for a bakery would only be permitted up to a 90% exemption.

If the

Idaho Legislature wanted to adopt such a model for low-income housing, it is free to do so.

In

that event, Appellant would be permitted up to an 83% exemption but would pay property tax on
the remaining 17% that it leases out to those tenants who are not low income.
not what the statute currently says.

However, this is

Instead, I.C. § 63-60200 says "all" of the units must be

rented to the three identified income classes.
It is clear that any redress Appellant seeks to change this language or interpret it
differently should be placed before the legislature that can change the laws, not the courts that
cannot.

III.

APPELLANT MUST TERMINATE ITS REGULATORY AGREEMENT TO
APPLY FOR THE I.C. § 63-602GG PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION.

Appellant has elected to qualify as Section 42 housing and is subject to a regulatory
agreement.

See Regulatory Agreement R. pp. 70-92, Agreement ofLimited Partnership R. pp.
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94-157, Redemption Agreement R. pp. 172-186.

Property tax relief for "Section 42 low-

income" housing is considered under LC. § 63-205A, which allows for reduction in value for tax
assessment purposes.

Appellants therefore inappropriately requested an exemption for

"nonprofit low-income housing" under LC.§ 63-60200 where the legislature clearly provided
another section under which Appellants should seek relief.

Conversely, I.C. § 63-60200

pertains to those "non-profit" organizations that are not section 42 housing.

Why else would

there be two entirely different statutes?
As a result, until Appellant terminates its regulatory agreement and reapplies meeting the
specifications above, an exemption under I.C. § 62-60200 must be denied.

IV.

CITATION TO
INAPPLICABLE.

IDAHO

HOUSING

AND

FINANCE

STATUTES

IS

Appellant relies heavily on cross referencing LC. § 603GG(c)(3) with LC. § 67-6201(c),
which deals exclusively with Idaho Housing and Finance (IHFA) properties.
this argument is the same as the Section 42 housing argument:
exemption under LC.§ 67-6208.
be applied to IHFA properties.

The problem with

Idaho has its own IHFA

Further, this code chapter (LC. § 67-6201 et. seq.) is only to
The property at issue here, however, is owned by Aspen Park,

Inc., which is not an IHF A property.
Where the plain language of both statutes is clear about their scope of property covered,
attempting to read these statutes together only creates unnecessary confusion.

V.

PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS ARE NOT PRESUMED.
TAXPAYER MUST MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

INSTEAD THE

To obtain a property tax exemption, the burden of proof falls on the taxpayer to make the
showing that a tax exemption applies.

See Sunset Mem'l Gardens, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax

Comm'n, 80 Idaho 206, 219, 327 P.2d 766, 774 (1958).
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"Exemptions are never presumed. The

burden is on a claimant to establish clearly a right to exemption. It must be in terms so specific
and certain as to leave no room for doubt."
P. 696, 62 A.L.R. 323.

Id. referencing Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66, 272

"The basis of tax exemptions is the accomplislunent of public purpose

and not the favoring of particular persons or corporations at the expense of taxpayers generally."

Id.

Further,
All tax exemption statutes be strictly and narrowly construed against
the taxpayer, who must show a clear entitlement, and in favor of the
state. Courts may not presume exemptions, nor may they extend an
exemption by judicial construction where not specifically
authorized.

Ada Cty. Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425,428, 849 P.2d 98, 101
(1993).
In this case, it is clear that 100% of the units are not dedicated to low-income housing
where 17% of them are leased to tenants that exceed the 60% county median income threshold.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, Appellant fails to dedicate "all" of its housing units to low-income
housing in the "manner" prescribed statute.

Therefore, the property tax exemption must be

denied.
Reliance on an interpretation, albeit from astute minds, that allows up to 45% of the units
to be rented by non-low-income occupants does not follow the plain language of the statute and
is misplaced.

Further, Appellant's argument flies in the face of performance-based tax

exemptions for other valuable non-profit and charitable organizations such as LC. § 63-602C,
which requires a deduction from the exemption for uses that violate the non-profit purpose of the
organization.

Clearly the legislature could not have felt so strongly about low-income housing

that low-income housing units only have to dedicate a little more than half of its units to a lowRESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 14

income purpose in orde r to obtain a complete exempti on.

For this reason, not only did the

legis lature use the te rm ··all .. of the hou sing units, it also dictated the manner in whi ch " all"
( I 00%) of the " units shall be rented.''

1.C. § 63-602GG(c) (3).

W hil e unfo rtunate for Appellants, the practical effect o r thi s denial is that Appellant must
pay property taxes- not fil e fo r bankruptcy, forego its income tax exempti on, or be precluded
from applying for other tax exemptions for which it may otherwise qualify .
d iffere nt resu lt sho uld be presented to the legislature.

A request fo r a

Until then, however, the statute is clear.

Where the facts are not in dispute and the statute and standards of law are clear the
District Court' s decision must be affirmed and the tax exemption denied .

ATTORNEYS FEES
Where the statutory language of I.C. § 63-602GG is clear and unambiguous, and where it
is clear Appellant' s redress can only be sought through the legislature fo r a change in the law,
Appellant should be required to pay Bonnevi lle County's costs and attorneys fees pursuant to
LC.§ 12-11 7, l.C. § 12-1 2 1, I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e), and I.A.R. 40 and 41.
DATED this

.2_J_ day of June, 2018.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thi s ~ / day of June, 20 18, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document upon the foll owing:
[ ] Mai ling
[ X] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
208.523.4474
[ X ] E-Mail timhopk ings@hopkinsroden.com
[ ] Overnig ht Mail
[ ] Courtho use Box

C. Timothy Hopkins
H OPKINS RODEN CROCKET H ANSEN

&

H OOPES, P LLC

428 Park Ave.
Idaho Falls ID 83 402

[ X] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
208.523.4474
[ X] E-Mail
mkane@ kt law.net
[ ] Overni ght Mail
[ ] Courthouse Box

Michael Kane
M ichael Kane & Associates, PLLC
4355 West Emerals Street, Sui te 190
Boise, ID 83 706

~
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